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DISCRIMINATION LAW-DEFINING THE HOSTILE WORK ENVI­
RONMENT CLAIM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII 
INTRODUCTION 
Defining sexual harassment! is a complex challenge to our legal 
system. For many years, women have recounted their experiences,2 
describing sexually harassing behavior as part of their daily lives.3 De­
1. The definition of sexual harassment is the subject of this comment. The need to 
redefine sexual harassment stems from the debate on how to define "sex." The term "sex" 
has been variously interpreted by courts in assessing Title VII claims. One purpose of this 
comment is to demonstrate that those various interpretations have been inconsistent, and to 
suggest some refinement in the use of the term "sex" to include both sex and gender role 
elements. For instance, commentators define sexual harassment differently: "the unwanted 
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power," C. 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEXUAL DIS­
CRIMINATION I (1979); and "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a wo­
man's sex role over her function as worker." L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 14-15 (1978). 
2. This comment focuses on the sexual harassment of working women by men. 
However, men also have alleged sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of sex in 
the workplace. See, e.g., Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 
1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (male plaintiff could not bring a § 1983 claim against his female super­
visor based on Title VII since she was not an employer); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 
597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (male employee 
established prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual harassment 
based on unwelcome homosexual advances by manager); Wright v. Methodist Youth 
Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. III. 1981) (discharge of a male employee for refusing to 
accept sexual advances of homosexual supervisor is a violation of Title VII). 
Note that, in the two cases above involving unwelcome homosexual advances, the em­
ployees were protected because they were male, not because they were either heterosexual 
or homosexual. Thus, when a male supervisor approaches only male employees, there is a 
violation of Title VII on the basis of sex, just as there would be if a male supervisor ap­
proached only female employees. An interesting dilemma might arise in the case of a "bi­
sexual supervisor who demands sexual favors from members of both sexes." 1 C. 
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 8.7.1,360 
n.2 (1988). There would probably not be a violation of Title VII, as the employees would 
not be singled out on the basis of sex. Furthermore, it is important to note that Title VII 
does not include sexual orientation as a protected category, nor has it been interpreted to 
protect homosexuals in the workplace. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 
327 (9th Cir. 1979). 
3. An early survey of sexual harassment experiences in the United States appeared in 
Harper's Bazaar in 1908. See Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the 
Distance Travelled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 445, 451-52 (1981). A 
contemporary study of 9000 working women appeared in Redbook magazine in 1976. See 
Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, 
REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149. The author discovered that "nearly 9 out of 10 women 
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spite the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace and its ac­
ceptance as a legal concept, women workers still fail to report sexually 
harassing' behavior, causing some of these women to experience detri­
mental psychological and physical effects or a delay in career 
advancement.4 
In defining sexual harassment, courts have recognized that un­
wanted sexual advances or other sexually harassing behavior is a form 
of discrimination on the basis of sex. S Congress prohibited this form 
of discrimination with the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.6 Although Congress has never prohibited sexual harass­
ment specifically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
an agency created" by the Civil Rights Act,7 has developed advisory 
report[ed)" some form of unwanted visual, verbal; or physical attention in the workplace. 
Id.at217. 
However, no study or survey can reflect truly the extent of sexual harassment in the 
workplace. A survey conducted by the Harvard Business Review and Redbook magazine in 
1981 reported that male and female workers "agree on what harassment is," but "disagree 
strongly on how frequently it occurs." See Collins & Blodgett, Sexual Harassment . .. 
Some See It ... Some Won't, 59 HARV. Bus. REV. 76, at 77 (Mar.- Apr. 1981). Yet, 
another study that examined sexuality in a more general context demonstrated a gender 
gap in defining sexual harassment. See B. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IM­
PACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 
42-54 (1985). "Men report almost as many overtures from women under some circum­
stances, but men are more likely to view such encounters positively, to see them as fun and 
mutually entered. A high proportion of the more serious incidents reported by men are 
sexual touching, but by their own reports, many do not view .sexual touching as sexual 
harassment." Id. at 53. For a more recent report on the incidence of sexual harassment in 
the workplace, see Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An Interdisciplinary Examination of 
Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M.L. REV. 91, 95-98 (1987). 
4. A harassed woman, who may feel intimidated at possible repercussions of a com­
plaint of sexual harassment, may ignore the problem or resign to avoid the issue. 
Those who complain, as well as those who do not, express fears that their com­
plaints will be ignored, will not be believed, that they instead will be blamed, that 
they will be considered "unprofessional," or "asking for it," or told that this 
problem is too petty or trivial for a grown woman to worry about, and that they 
are blowing it all oui of proportion. 
C. MACKINNON, supra note I, at 49. 
Ignoring the sexual harassment may cause the woman to feel depression, anger, aliena­
tion, anxiety, or other psychological traumas leading to emotional breakdown. Physical 
effects often include headaches, nausea, loss of appetite, and fatigue. See Comment, A 
Theory ofTort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 
1464-66 (1986). 
5. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment is a 
form of discrimin"ation on the basis of sex actionable under Title VII). 
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, 
color, religion, or sex». 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 and 5 (1982). 
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guidelines for identifying valid sexual harassment claims. 8 
Actionable sexual harassment exists in two forms: the quid pro 
quo claim and the hostile work environment claim.9 In a quid pro quo 
situation, an employer proposes to exchange an economic benefit for 
sexual acquiescenCe by an employee.1O The second actionable claim of 
sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, is more subtle and 
need not be characterized by the loss of an economic benefit. 11 A hos­
tile work environment claim can arise from conduct of a sexual nature 
based on sex or based on gender. 12 A claim based on sex involves 
conduct of a sexual nature, such as unwelcome touch,13 leering, innu­
endoes, crude jokes, or the display of explicit pictures. A claim based 
on gender, on the other hand, involves conduct that is non-sexual, and 
detrimental to a woman as a member of a protected class. 14 
. This comment attempts to define the hostile work environment 
claim of sexual harassment under Title VII: IS Part I summarizes the 
8. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1988). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion issued advisory guidelines that employers and employees could use in interpreting 
conduct as sexual harassment. See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of these guidelines. . 
9. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 32-47. 
10. . The quid pro quo exchange may be an explicit exchange, such as, "If you won't 
sleep with me, you won't get your promotion," or something less explicit, "Ir.y~u want the 
job, you have to do something 'nice' for me." 
11. For an argument that the distinction between the quid'pro quo claim and the 
hostile work environment claim should be eliminated, see Note, Abolishing the Quid Pro 
Quo and Work Environment Distinctions in Sexual Harassment Cases under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964: Vinson 1'. Taylor, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 177 (1985). 
12. The term "sex" or "sexual" is commonly and colloquially used to refer to men or 
women in a generic sense. However, social science terminology has evolved more precise 
language usage. "Sex" is reserved for anatomical identity, based on genitalia and physical 
secondary sex characteristics. The term "gender" is used to indicate aspects of identity or 
behavior related to both perception of self and social roles. See M. RICHMOND-ABBOTT, 
MASCULINE AND FEMININE: SEX ROLES OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 41-53 (1983). 
13; For a discussion of touch and sexuality, see N. HENLEY, BODY POLmcs: 
POWER, SEX, AND NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 108-23 (1977). Unwelcome touch may 
include, but is not limited to, pinching, deliberate fondling, or brushing against another's 
body. It is interesting to note that men and women view their body accessibility to touch 
differently. In addition, in one study, "[w]omen respondents reported higher amounts of 
being touched by others than did men (and they also reported hig..'l.er levels of touching 
others themselves)." Id. at 112. 
14. See supra note 12. The ways in' which courts have contributed to this confusion 
is demonstrated by their varying interpretations of the word "sexual" to refer to situations 
involving discrimination with regard to both sex and gender. See infra notes 195-248 and 
accompanying text. 
15. In addition to Title VII, another avenue is available under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Note, The Emerging Law ofSexual Harassment: 
ReliefAvailable to the Public Employee, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 677, 685-87 (1987). See, 
e.g., Woerner v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517, 518-19 (N.D. III. 1981) (sexual harassment 
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development of the sexual harassment claim, focusing on the use of 
Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Final 
Guidelines to define sexual harassment in the workplace.16 Part II 
discusses the conceptual framework that courts have used to recognize 
a hostile work environment claimY Part III identifies fact patterns 
which represent a clear claim of hostile work environment sexual har­
assment. IS Part IV focuses on controversial claims of verbal sexual 
harassment and non-verbal sexual harassment involving explicit pic­
tures, drawings, and notes. 19 These foregoing sections limit the analy­
sis of sexual harassment to the examination of conduct pertaining to a 
woman as a sexual being. Part V, however, considers an expanded 
definition of hostile work environment sexual harassment by including 
claims of gender harassment, which involves conduct that is non­
sexual.20 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM 

UNDER TITLE VII 

A. Using Title VII to Define Sexual Harassment in the Workplace 
Congress, seeking to outlaw employment discrimination, passed 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer­
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other­
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com­
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
that is directed solely at plaintiff because she is a woman is cognizable under the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution). 
Relief is also available in tort law. For a complete discussion of tort liability in sexual 
harassment cases, see Dworkin, Ginger, & MaHor, Theories ofRecovery for Sexual Harass­
ment: Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 137-46 (1988); Comment, supra 
note 4, at 1475-94; Note, The Dehumanizing Puzzle of Sexual Harassment: A Survey of 
Law Concerning Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 597-603 
(1985). . 
16. See infra notes 21-68 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 69-89 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 90-126 and accompanying text. 
19. This comment refers to such claims of non-verbal sexual harassment as "sym­
bolic harassment." The author ofthis comment coined the term "symbolic harassment" by 
analogy to the concept of symbolic expression. Symbolic expression, a message delivered 
by non-verbal conduct, is within the scope of constitutional protection under the first 
amendment. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (using a flag to convey a 
message of peace). See infra notes 127-94 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 195-248 and accompanying text. 
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21 
In addition to granting equal treatment to all employees, Congress es­
tablished the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to 
guide the implementation of Title VII and to encourage compliance 
. with the Act. 22 
Discrimination on the basis of sex originally was not part of the 
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 The United States House of 
Representatives did not even consider this form of discrimination until 
the day before the passage of the Act, when Representative Howard 
Smith of Virginia proposed a floor amendment to the Act to include 
sex under Title VII.24 Those in opposition to the amendment, how­
ever, argued that an amendment prohibiting "[discrimination on the 
basis of sex] would not be to the best advantage of women at this 
time."2s Nonetheless, Representative Smith's amendment was 
adopted, and the bill passed with the word "sex" included among the 
words race, color, religion, and national origin.26 Under the Equal 
Opportunity Act of 1972,27 Congress reiterated its position regarding 
discrimination on the basis of sex by declaring that "[it] is no less seri­
ous than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be 
accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlaw­
21. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). 
22. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-4 and 5 (1982). 
23. During the extensive committee hearings on the civil rights bill, discrimination 
on the basis of sex was hardly mentioned. The only time the word "sex" waS used during 
the committee hearings in relation to the proposed Act was before the House Rules Com­
mittee, where a motion to amend the bill to add sex to the other classifications was de­
feated. 
It is not clear why the word "sex" was so hastily included in the proposed Act. One 
Congresswoman commented that most people who opposed the Civil Rights bill were the 
strongest advocates of the amendment to include sex and that the intent of the sponsor was 
to enlist additional opposition to Title VII. These allegations were denied by the amend­
ment's sponsor. Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of1964,51 
MINN. L. REV. 877, 883 n.34 (1967). For a detailed review of the legislative history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its treatment of discrimination on the basis of sex, see id. at 
879-85. 
24. 110 CoNG. REc. 2577 (1964). 
25. Id. In a letter from Assistant Secretary of Labor, Esther Peterson, dated Febru­
ary 7, 1964, the Department of Labor responded to the proposed amendment by stating: 
"'We are aware that this order could be expanded to forbid discrimination on the basis of 
sex. But discrimination based on sex, the Commission believes, involves problems suffi­
ciently different from discrimination based on the other factors listed to make separate 
treatment preferable.' .. (quoting from a Report on the President's Commission on the Sta­
tus of Women). Id. 
26. See 110 CoNG. REC. 2584 (1964). 
27. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 
(1982». 
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ful discrimination. "28 
In the 1970's, several courts began to expand this definition of 
unlawful discrimination to include other behavior in a claim of dis­
crimination on the basis of sex. The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia in Williams v. Saxbe 29 considered whether 
unwelcome sexual behavior such as sexual advances by a male supervi­
sor constituted unlawful discrimination within the meaning of Title 
VII. Addressing the issue of Congress' intent when it enacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the district court in Williams stated: 
[T]here is ample evidence that Congress' intent was not to limit the 
scope and effect of Title VII, but rather, to have it b~oadly con­
strued. Furthermore, the plain meaning of the term "sex discrimi­
nation" as used in the statute encompasses discrimination between 
genders whether the discrimination is the result of a well-recognized 
sex stereotype or for any other reason. . . . There therefore can be 
no question that the statutory prohibition of [Title VII] reaches all 
discrimination affecting employment which is based on gender.3o 
Unwelcome sexual advances, which would not have occurred but for 
claimant's sex, therefore were held to be within the meaning of dis­
crimination on the basis of sex under Title VIP' Similarly, in Barnes 
v. Costle,32 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
acknowledged that when a female employee refuses to submit to the 
sexual advances of her male supervisor and, as a result, loses an eco­
nomic benefit, her employer is guilty of an illegal employment practice 
under Title VII.33 
The idea that "sexual harassment" was an actionable claim under 
Title VII developed gradually among the courts. When a plaintiff spe­
cifically alleged sexual harassment as her claim instead of discrimina­
tion on the basis of sex, courts initially were reluctant to recognize a 
sexual harassment cause of action under Title VII.34 In Corne v. 
28. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2141. 
29. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds and remanded sub nom., 
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 124{) (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. 
Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980). 
30. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658. 
31. Id. at 657-58. 
32. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
33. Id. at 990-91. 
34. See Tomkins v. Public Servo Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.I. 
1976) ("[Title VII] is not intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to 
physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened 
to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley."), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 
1977). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, 
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Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 35 the district court decided that a supervisor's 
verbal and physical sexual advances toward a female employee consti­
tuted a personal "peculiarity or mannerism" of the supervisor.36 The 
court reasoned that "[i]t would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of 
activity involved here was contemplated by the [Civil Rights] Act" 
because such a holding would create "a potential federal lawsuit every 
time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances to­
ward another."37 
Despite the district court's holding in Corne that unwelcome sex­
ual advances are a personal- problem and not a Title VII problem, not 
all courts were so anxious to dismiss sexual harassment claims. In 
Munford v. James T. Barnes & CO.,38 the court concluded that sexual 
harassment was a form of discrimination on the basis of sex and that it 
was a type of activity prohibited by Title VII.39 The Munford court 
agreed with the reasoning of the courts in Williams and Barnes that 
Title VII "prohibits any impediment to employment which affects one 
gender but not the other," and that sexual harassment is just such an 
impediment.40 
As these courts began to recognize sexual harassment claims of 
the quid pro quo type, in which sexual favors are solicited in exchange 
for an economic benefit, courts also questioned the existence of an­
other more subtle type of sexual harassment-the hostile work envi­
ronment claim. Bundy v. Jackson,41 the first case to recognize a claim 
of a sexually hostile work environment, differed from previous sexual 
harassment cases in that the employee did not allege a loss of a tangi­
ble job benefit. Instead, she alleged that sexually stereotyped insults, 
such as "telling her that 'any man in his right mind would want to 
rape you,' " and degrading propositions to "spend the workday after­
noon with him at his apartment," affected her work environment and 
holding that the court took too narrow a view of discrimination on the basis of sex under 
Title VII. Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49. . 
For a further discussion of case law addressing sexual harassment claims during the 
1970's, see Conte & Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment-Some Proposals Toward 
More Realistic Standards 0/ Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 407, 419-26 (1982-83). 
35. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
36. 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
37. Id. 
38. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (employee who refused sexual advances 
from her supervisor subsequently was subjected to repeated sexual innuendoes). 
39. Id. at 465-66. 
40. [d. at 465. 
41. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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were thus prohibited by Title VII.42 
The court in Bundy applied the interpretations of Title VII used 
previously in race and ethnic discrimination cases to analyze whether 
" 'conditions of employment' include[d] the psychological and emo­
tional work environment."43 Specifically, the court relied heavily on 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Rogers v. EEOC,44 an 
ethnic discriminatory environment case, to identify a sexually discrim­
inatory work environment. The court in Bundy, following the lead of 
Judge Goldberg's opinion in Rogers, extended the principles of Title 
VII to include a protection of an individual's psychological well-being 
from sexually harassing conduct as a condition of employment.4s 
[T]he phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in 
Section 703 [of Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps 
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working envi­
ronment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination. . . . 
One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted 
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psy­
chological stability of minority group workers ....46 
Furthermore, Bundy reiterated the congressional intent of Title VII 
enunciated in Rogers, that "Congress chose neither to enumerate spe­
cific discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parame­
ter of such nefarious activities ...."47 
However,it was not until 1986 that the United States Supreme 
Court recognized the hostile work environment claim as a form of sex­
ual harassment actionable under Title VII. In Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson,48 a supervisor fondled female employees in public and repeat­
42. Id. at 940. 
43. Id. at 944. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 
87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (a pattern of derogatory ethnic and racial remarks may violate Title 
VII if found to create a hostile work el!vironment); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. 
City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (segregated employee eating clubs 
may violate Title VII if injurious to employee's psychological well-being), cert. denied sub 
nom., Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977). 
44. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (Spanish-surnamed employee brought an action 
against her former employer for ethnic discrimination), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
45. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944-45. 
46. Id. at 944 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972». 
47. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 957 (1972». Judge Goldberg in Rogers observed that "[Title VII] evinces a Con­
gressional intention to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms." Rogers, 454 
F.2d at 238. 
48. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
1989] TITLE VII AND THE "HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT" lSI 
edly asked one employee to have sexual relations with him.49 Vinson 
alleged that during her four years of employment, she was harassed 
constantly by her supervisor and that such conduct affected her work 
environment to the point where she frequently became ill and was dis­
charged for excessive sick leave. 50 In considering Vinson's claim, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a hostile work environ­
ment claim of sexual harassment.51 Although it failed to create a de­
tailed framework for identifying a hostile work environment, 52 the 
Court observed that "[fjor sexual harassment to be actionable, it must 
be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the vic­
tim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' "53 
The harassment in this case was pervasive enough to provide a basis 
for stating a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. 54 
B. 	 Using the EEOC Final Guidelines in an Attempt to Define 
Sexual Harassment 
On November 10, 1980, the EEOC published Final Guidelines55 
broadly defining sexual harassment and providing a statutory frame­
work for analyzing behavior in the workplace. The first section con­
tains a three-part definition of harassment on the basis of sex: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual har­
assment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explic­
itly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, 
49. 	 Id. at 60. 
50. 	 Id. 
51. 	 Id. at 66. 
52. For a more extensive discussion of Vinson and the repercussions of that decision, 
see Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: What Makes a Work Environment "Hostile"?, 
40 ARK. L. REv. 857 (1987); Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration 0/ 
Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson and the Law 0/Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U.L. REV. 
445 (1987); Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Sexual Harassment at Work, 10 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 203 (1987); Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Finally a Supreme Coun 
Ruling on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: For What It's Worth, 38 MERCER L. REV. 
733 (1987). 
53. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 
(11th Cir. 1982». For a further discussion of Henson, see infra notes 69-74 and accompa­
nying text. 
54. 	 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67. 
55. On April II, 1980, interim guidelines were published in the Federal Register for 
a sixty-day period. See Final Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980). After receiving a 
very favorable response from the public, the interim guidelines were altered slightly to 
become the Final Guidelines. For a discussion of the minor changes that the EEOC made 
to the interim guidelines, see Smith, Prologue to the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harass­
ment, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 471 (1981). 
152 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW (Vol. 11:143 
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is 
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individ­
ual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.S6 
According to these guidelines, sexual harassment is harassment di­
rected at the "sex" of the employee. 57 The EEOC, in drafting the Fi­
nal Guidelines, did not provide specific definitions of critical terms, 
notably "sex," "unwelcome sexual advances," "requests for sexual fa­
vors," and "other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." The 
apparent rationale for this general definition is that it is difficult to 
identify every form of sexually harassing conduct. "[T]he same ac­
tions which, under one set of circumstances, would constitute sexual 
harassment, might, under another set of circumstances, constitute ac­
ceptable social behavior."58 
In addition to defining .sexual harassment broadly as "unwelcome 
sexual advances" or "requests for sexual favors," the guidelines re­
quire that the harassing behavior affect the individual's employment in 
one of three ways. The first two ways are forms of quid pro quo har­
assment. If submission to the proscribed conduct is made a condition 
of employment or is used as the basis for employment decisions, then 
it is quid pro quo harassment because an economic benefit is ex­
changed for sexual compliance. 59 The third possible way for the be­
havior to affect the individual's employment is for the conduct to 
interfere unreasonably with the employee's work performance, thus 
creating an offensive or hostile work environment.60 
The EEOC stated further in the Final Guidelines that it would 
consider facts alleging sexual harassment on "a case by case basis," 
looking "at the record as a whole and at the. totality of the circum­
stances," paying particular attention to the context and nature of the 
harassment.61 The remainder of the guidelines focuses on the issues of 
employer liability for sexually harassed employees and prevention of 
sexual harassment in the workplace.62 
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. II(a) (1988). 
57. Id. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the terin "sex." 
58. Smith, supra note 55, at 473-74. . 
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11 (a) (1988). See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
60. 29 C.F.R. . § 1604.11 (a) (1988). 
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11 (b) (1988). 
62. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c)-(g) (1988). The guidelinc;:s point out that an "[em­
ployer] is responsible for its [sexually harassing] acts and those of its agents and supervisory 
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts com­
plained of were autho~zed or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether 
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While the EEOC Final Guidelines may provide some assistance 
for courts considering sexual harassment claims,63 there are several 
issues that the guidelines leave unresolved. As mentioned previously, 
the guidelines do not define "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature."64 Therefore, a potentially wide t:ange of conduct can be en­
compassed by this phrase. Unwelcome touches and obscene language 
most likely would be considered sexual harassment within this phrase, 
but courts also have found that commercial pictures of half-nude wo­
men or hand-drawn explicit caricatures of women are a form of sexual 
harassment.65 In addition, the phrase "sexual nature" in the guide­
lines can· be construed in two different ways.66 It can be interpreted 
either as conduct discriminating on the basis of sex in a biological 
sense or as conduct discriminating on the basis of gender.67 Finally, 
the guidelines do not define the line between an offensive work envi­
ronment and an inoffensive one. Instead, the offensiveness of the work 
environment and a "determination of the legality of a particular action 
will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis. "68 
In short, sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII as a 
form of discrimination on the basis of sex. The EEOC developed a 
broad definition of sexual harassment, using all-encompassing lan­
the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) 
(1988). This comment will not address the issue of employer liability. For a further discus­
sion of employer liability in sexual harassment cases, see Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicari­
ous Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope ofEmployment Rule and Related Legal 
Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1988); Smith, When Should an Employer Be Held 
Liable For the Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Who Creates a Hostile Work Environ­
ment? A Proposed Theory ofLiability, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 285 (1987); Note, Employer Liabil­
ityforSexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under Title VII, 37 CATH. U.L. REv. 245 (1987); 
Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1987); Note, Employment Discrimination­
Defining an Employer's Liability Under Title VII for On-the-Job Sexual Harassment: The 
Adoption ofa Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C.L. REV. 795 (1984). 
63. In Vinson, the Supreme Court stated that the EEOC guidelines, " 'while not con­
trolling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.''' Vin­
son, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944». Some courts, however, explicitly de­
cline to follow these guidelines. In Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 560 F. 
Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983), the court stated that "[t]he EEOC guidelines, while entitled to 
deference, do not have the force and effect of law and ... the Court declines to apply the 
guidelines in a hostile environment case involving supervisory personnel." Id. at 1198 
(footnote omitted). 
64. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
65. See infra notes 152-94 and accompanying text. 
66. See infra notes 195-248 and accompanying text. 
67. For the distinction between sex and gender, see supra note 12. 

~8. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(b) (1988). 
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guage to advise employers, employees, and courts that many forms of 
conduct can be construed as sexual harassment causing an offensive or 
hostile work environment. 
II. THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 
In Henson v. City ofDundee,69 the Court of Appeals for the Elev­
enth Circuit delineated the necessary elements of a hostile work envi­
ronment claim against an employer under Title VII. These elements 
include the following: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group, 
i.e., a simple stipulation that the employee is a man or a woman;70 
(2) the employee is subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the 
harassment complained of is based upon sex, i.e., but for the fact of 
claimant's sex, she would not have been the object of harassment; 
(4) the harassment complained of affects a "term, condition, or privi­
lege" of employment; and (5) liability is determined under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior.71 
The second Henson element, that the employee is subject to un­
welcome sexual harassment, is the foundation of a hostile work envi­
ronment claim. In order to establish unwelcome sexual harassment, 
the employee would first have to show that the alleged conduct is sex­
ual harassment as defined by either the EEOC guidelines or other ap­
propriate guidelines or through prior case law. Second, the employee 
must prove that the conduct was "unwelcome in the sense that the 
employee did not solicit or incite [the behavior], and in the sense that 
the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."72 Fi­
nally, in order for conduct to be actionable, Henson requires that the 
"[sexual harassment] must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the 
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ­
ment."73 In determining whether the behavior is pervasive, the Hen­
son test involves consideration of whether the "sexual harassment at 
69. 682 F.2d 897 (lIth Cir. 1982). In Henson, the plaintiff was a police dispatcher 
who alleged that her supervisor continually propositioned her and that she had been sub­
jected to a hostile work environment created by daily use of vulgar language. Id. at 899. 
70. While the court correctly decided that this is an element that needs to be stipu­
lated, it is highly probable that such a determination would require neither excessive time 
nor substantive examination. 
71. Id. at 903-05. One commentator has suggested a revision of the Henson test, 
which "align[s] all actions involving harassment," and "removes the unnecessary showing 
of unwelcomeness." Vhay, The Harms ofAsking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of 
Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 355-56 (1988). See supra note 62 for a discus­
sion of employer liability for sexual harassment. 
72. Id. at 903. 
73. Id. at 904. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text for the endorsement of 
this standard by the Supreme Court in Vinson. 
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the workplace is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the 
psychological well being of employees . . . . "74 
Courts have relied on Henson to create their own frameworks for 
resolving hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.7s For 
instance, in Katz v. Do/e,76 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
adopted a two-step analysis for determining whether an offensive work 
environment exists. 
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that sexually 
harassing actions took place, and if this is done, the employer may 
rebut the showing either directly, by proving that the events did not 
take place, or indirectly, by showing that they were isolated or gen­
uinely trivial. Second, the plaintiff must show that the employer 
knew or should have known of the harassment, and took no effec­
tual action to correct the situation. 77 
Similarly, in Downes v. Federal Aviation Administration,78 the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted its own test, drawing upon 
Henson. According to the Downes court, to establish a hostile work 
environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the misconduct has at 
least two elements: "(1) the offensive conduct must be sufficiently per­
vasive so as to alter the conditions of employment, and (2) be suffi­
ciently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well­
being of an employee."79 Therefore, in both Katz and Downes, the 
courts stressed the need, as did the court in Henson, for the plaintiff to 
prove that sexually harassing behavior took place in a pervasive, offen­
sive manner. 
Analyzing these various frameworks, it appears that courts rely 
74. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. 
75. See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987). 
The dissent proposed the following two-step test for analyzing hostile environment sexual 
harassment claims: 
First, it must be determined whether or not the allegedly discriminatory behavior 
was ambiguously or patently offensive. Where the conduct was patently offensive 
and the offending individual was plaintiff's supervisor, the inquiry may end: with 
or without notification of the wrong, the employer may be held liable. However, 
where it is found that the supervisor's behavior was ambiguous, i.e., less than 
overtly offensive, a second finding must be made as to whether the plaintiff, by 
some objective action at the time of the allegedly offensive conduct displayed ob­
jection to the conduct of the supervisor. 
Id. at 1566-67 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
76. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text for 
a full discussion of this case . 
. 77. Katz, 709 F.2d at 255-56. 
78. 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text for 
a full discussion of this case. 
79. Downes, 775 F.2d at 292. 
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on a variety of distinctions to determine whether behavior is action­
able as sexual harassment. First, courts identify the kind of conduct 
experienced by the victim. Sexually harassing conduct can take many 
forms: physical abuse, verbal harassment, or non-verbal symbolic har­
assment, which is harassment of a woman with a symbolic message. 80 
Second, courts consider the frequency of the conduct. Applying a per­
vasive standard, the conduct must be a condition of employment8! and 
not a single isolated instance.82 "A hostile working environment is 
shown when the incidents of harassment occur either in concert or 
with a regularity that can reasonably be termed pervasive."83 Third, 
courts examine the nature of the conduct to determine whether it is 
offensive. Since every case is factually different, what is considered 
offensive in one situation may not be offensive in another, similar situ­
ation. 84 In addition, people have different perceptions of what kind of 
conduct constitutes offensive behavior.8s Men and women have differ­
ent perceptions of offensive conduct, 86 and individuals may view the 
degree of offensiveness differently. The differing views among women 
80. See infra notes 152-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of symbolic har­
assment. See supra note ·19 for a discussion of symbolic harassment. 
8!' In Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 
(1972), Judge Goldberg articulated that "conditions of employment" for Title VII purposes 
includes the subtle "psychological as well as economic fringes" of an employee's work envi­
ronment. Id. at 238. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
82. In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), see supra notes 41-47 and 
accompanying text, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals observed that fre­
quent sexually harassing conduct was an essential element of the hostile work environment 
claim. The Court of Appeals noted that although a pattern of harassment directed at an 
employee can violate Title VII, an isolated instance of sexually harassing behavior is not 
sufficient to constitute a hostile work environment. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943 n.9. 
83. Lopez v. SB Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Snell v. 
Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986) ("the proliferation of demeaning litera­
ture and epithets was sufficiently continuous and pervasive to establish a 'concerted pattern 
of harassment' in violation of Title VII"). 
84. For instance, in Jones v. Wesco Investments, Inc., 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988), 
the president of Wesco argued in his brief that since a traditional place where a man meets 
a woman is at the work place, there is nothing wrong with a man, even a supervisor, telling 
a female that she looks nice or asking a female out on a date. Id. at 1157 n.6. 
85. This comment's perception of offensive conduct is derived from Justice Stevens' 
opinion in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, Justice Stevens ob­
served that "[o]bnoxious, gutter language describing [sexual acts] has the effect of debasing 
and brutalizing human beings by requcing them to their mere bodily functions .... Verbal 
or physical acts exposing those intimacies are offensive irrespective of any message that 
may accompany the exposure." Id. at 746 n.23. 
86. Different perceptions of sexual harassment are evident because sexual harass­
ment is also defined in the context of power. "Sexual harassment is not only a product of 
gender-based dominance; it plays an important role in maintaining that dominance and 
perpetuating circumstances in which domination-based views become cultural norms." 
Bratton, supra note 3, at 98. "Male perceptions of sexual harassment have triumphed pre­
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and men are important, especially because it is the victim who objects 
to the conduct and alleges sexual harassment. 
Finally, courts focus on the behavior between the harasser and 
the victim to determine if it is "unwelcome in the sense that the em­
ployee did not solicit" the undesirable conduct. 87 In a sexual harass­
ment case, "[t]he correct inquiry is whether [the victim] by her 
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwel­
come."88 Since her conduct can only proceed from her perceptions 
and motives, a reasonable victim standard is implied. However, 
neither the Supreme Court in Vinson nor the EEOC guidelines explic­
itly states whether a reasonable person or a reasonable victim standard 
should apply in all sexual harassment cases. 89 
III. 	 A CLEAR CLAIM OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A review of hostile work environment sexual harassment cases 
cisely because of the ability of men to label women as outsiders and then determine cultural 
norms without reference to female perceptions." Goodman, supra note 3, at 468. 
These different perceptions were illustrated in a survey conducted by Redbook maga­
zine and Harvard Business Review. See Collins & Blodgett, supra note 3, at 84-89 for en­
closed exhibits of this survey. 
87. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. 
88. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68. 
89. One court, however, debated this issue. In Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), em. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987), the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals adopted the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment 
under similar circumstances. Id. at 620. The dissent, on the other hand, adopted a reason­
able victim standard "which simultaneously allows courts to consider salient sociological 
differences as well as shield employers from the neurotic complainant." Id. at 626 (Keith, 
J., dissenting). See infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this 
case. 
For a further discussion of the proper legal standard to apply in sexual harassment 
cases, see Comment, Employer: Beware of "Hostile Environment" Sexual Harassment, 26 
DUQ. L. REV. 461, 464 (1988) (author adopts the objective standard from the viewpoint of 
the reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances); Note, Sexual Harassment 
Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1459 
(1984) (the proper perspective is the reasonable victim standard, for it "would protect wo­
men from the offensive behavior that results from the divergence of male and female per­
ceptions of appropriate conduct"); Comment, supra note 4, at 1486-88 (author advocates a 
reasonable woman standard because "male employees might be unable to perceive that 
such conduct creates a humiliating and intimidating working environment"). 
Moreover, some courts appear to apply a "reasonable harasser" standard, whereby the 
court considers the behavior of the harasser toward the victim in determining whether the 
actions of the perpetrator were unreasonable. In Benton v. Kroger Co., 640 F. Supp. 1317 
(S.D. Tex. 1986), the court said that "[a]n inference that a boss may be crude and not so 
understanding, thereby making work life unpleasant for certain employees, is not proof of 
sexual harassment." Id. at 1321. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of this case. 
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evidences an emerging pattern which demonstrates a judicial willing­
ness to recognize a sexual harassment claim under Title VII if a plain­
tiff satisfies certain conditions. Several cases demonstrate that 
pervasive, offensive physical touching of a sexual nature accompanied 
by some form of verbal sexual harassment may be actionable under 
Title VII.90 In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services Inc. ,91 an em­
ployer touched the plaintiff without her consent as he "hit her '[a]cross 
the bottom' with the back of his hand. "92 In addition to physical con­
tact, the employer repeatedly harassed Phillips by asking "how often 
[she] and her husband had sex and 'what positions' they used" and by 
telling her that she had to "engage in oral sex with [her employer] at 
least three times a week. "93 In Phillips, the court accepted with little 
debate the claim that the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual 
harassment.94 
There are two reasons why the court in Phillips may have ac­
cepted this claim so readily. First, the continuous sexually harassing 
behavior satisfied the standard of pervasive and offensive behavior, and 
it clearly involved "sexual advances" and "verbal or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature."95 Second, the offensive behavior clearly affected 
terms and conditions of Phillips' employment, as she testified to medi­
cal problems, such as chronic anxiety, resulting from the sexual 
harassment.96 
The results in other cases with similar patterns of physical and 
verbal conduct highlight the importance of the pervasiveness element 
in the courts' evaluations of hostile work environment claims. In Rob­
son v. Eva's Super Market, Inc. ,97 an employer patted the plaintiff on 
her buttocks and felt the back of her blouse, without her permission, 
90. In addition to these distinctions, in most jurisdictions the plaintiff still would 
have to show that she satisfied the other elements of the Henson test. See supra notes 69-74 
and accompanying text. For instance, in order to make a complaint under Title VII action­
able, the offensive behavior would have to affect the terms and conditions of employment. 
See, e.g., Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-16 (D.N.D. 1981) (sexually 
harassing conduct, such as patting the plaintiff on her bottom or touching the plaintiff's 
breasts, and various other sexual overtures, was not actionable sexual harassment, for such 
behavior did not affect her employment, as plaintiff testified that she loved her work and 
would like to return to KFGO Radio despite the harassment). 
91. 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983). 
92. Id. at 1527. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1529. 
95. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the EEOC 
guidelines. 
96. Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1524. 
97. 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982). 
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to see if she was wearing a bra.98 The court held that this conduct, in 
addition to verbal harassment in the form of continual profanity di­
rected towards her, and an offer of one hundred dollars to "go to bed" 
with him, constituted sexual harassment.99 In Priest v. Rotary,IOO an 
employer engaged in many sexually harassing physical acts, such as 
placing his arms around an employee's waist, grabbing areas of her 
body, rubbing his body against her body, and unzipping her uni­
form. 101 The court held that such behavior, along with comments to 
another employee about her breasts, and other offensive remarks made 
about her to patrons, constituted sexual harassment. 102 Other cases 
point out that tucking a stray tag into a woman's biouse lO3 could be as 
sexually harassing as peering over a bathroom stall when a woman is 
there,I04 when accompanied by other factors such as a pattern of offen­
sive verbal harassment or other forms of physical sexual conduct. 
Not all physical and verbal conduct of a sexual nature in the 
workplace, however, violates Title VII. As the Vinson court stated, 
"[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and 
create an abusive working environment.' "IOS With pervasive behavior 
as the standard, courts look to whether the conduct was frequent, of­
fensive, and unwe1comed by the victim. 
Although in quid pro quo claims a court may accept a few in­
stances of behavior as sexual harassment, courts have yet to accept a 
single isolated instance of harassing behavior as conclusive evidence of 
a hostile work environment. 106 In Downes v. Federal A viation Admin­
istration,107 the court held that incidents of unusual behavior, such as 
"referring to [plaintiff] as the 'Dolly Parton of the office,' " verbally· 
speculating on the frequency of sexual relationships, describing a non­
98. Id. at 859. 
99. Id. at 859, 864. 
100. 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
101. Id. at 575. 
102. Id. at 582. 
103. See Harrison v. Reed Rubber Co., 603 F. Supp. 1457, 1459 (E.D. Mo. 1985) 
(various actions by the employer including placing his hand on an employee's hand consti­
tuted sexual harassment under Title VII). 
104. See Mays v. Williamson & Sons, Ianitorial Servs., 591 F. Supp. 1518, 1520 
(E.D. Ark. 1984) (employer's actions in grabbing an employee, and verbal abuses, consti­
tuted sexual harassment), aff'd, 775 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985). 
105. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). 
106. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevance 
of the frequency of sexually harassing conduct to the hostile work environment claim. 
107. 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For an earlier discussion of the analytical frame­
work which the court used in Downes, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
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employee in a degrading manner, and touching a plaintiff's hair were 
not a pervasive pattern of offensive conduct. lOS The court also noted 
that the conduct had not been repeated to the point where it became 
routine and thus was not a condition of employment. 109 Similarly, in 
Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 110 the plaintiff alleged "three 
specific incidences of sexual harassment over the course of the approx­
imately a year and a half she knew [her district manager]."lll Such 
sporadic events did not fit the pervasive standard that "depended on 
the existence of a 'poisoned' atmosphere."1l2 
In addition to the frequency of conduct, courts also must assess 
the offensiveness of the physical or verbal conduct. In Scott v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 113 the plaintiff alleged that fellow employees' sugges­
tive attitudes and behavior, such as requests to take her out, an alleged 
slap on her buttocks, and indecent comments concerning her sexual 
activity, created a hostile work environment. 114 The court stated that 
such examples "of being offensively propositioned" (i.e., a request to 
join an employee at a restaurant after work), and other suggestive be­
havior were not "so pervasive or psychologically debilitating that they 
affected [her] ability to perform on thejob."lls The incidents of sexual 
harassment, including an alleged slap on the buttocks, did not "rise to 
a level of 'hostility'. offensive enough to be considered actionable," and 
thus did not create a hostile work environment claim under Title 
VII.1l6 
Similarly, in Vermett v. Hough,117 the court considered whether 
the nature of defendant's conduct, specifically antics such as "goos­
ing" plaintiff with a shotgun, "holding a coffee cup shaped like a 
breast and fondling the nipple while staring at her chest," and stapling 
an attention slip to a broken zipper on someone's trousers, was sexu­
ally offensive. I IS The court concluded that the trooper's acts were 
more childish antics than offensive sexual harassment since they were 
not intended to be acts of a sexual nature; defendant "would have per­
108. Downes, 775 F.2d at 293-94. 
109. /d. at 294. 
110. 668 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 

Ill. Id. at 301. 

112. Id. (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981». 
113. 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986). 
114. /d. at 211-12. 
115. Id. at 214. 
116. Id. at 213-14. 
117. 627 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1986). 
118. Id. at 598-99. 
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formed [the acts] on any other trooper, male or female."119 The court 
probably did not interpret these childish antics as offensive behavior 
since they had only a minimal chance of debasing human beings, as 
they were not intended to offend any particular gender. 
After. determining whether the conduct itself is offensive, courts 
then question . .whether the plaintiff invited the conduct by her own 
behavior. In Sand v. Johnson Co., 120 the court considered behavior 
such as giving modest gifts, an attempted kiss, and a comment about a 
woman's bosom as flirtatious behavior rather than sexual harass­
ment.12l Since the employer pursued a relationship with Sand by giv­
ing gifts which she accepted,. the court concluded that these events 
indicated more of a "romantic ambience."122 Similarly, in Gan v. 
Kepro Circuit Sysrems,123 evidence of crude and sexually-oriented lan­
guage and physical conduct of a sexual nature, such as fondling the 
plaintiff, was considered' an example of flirtatious behavior because it 
was welcomed by plaintiff. 124 The fact .that the plaintiff often used 
sexually-oriented language and made her own marital sexual relation­
ship a regular topic of conversation at the office also influenced the 
court.12S Since she had contributed to the behavior, the plaintiff could 
not argue.that the sexually harassing behavior was unwelcome to her. 
In summary, if the sexually harassing conduct is both verbal and 
physical and represents an offensive pattern of unwelcome behavior, 
courts agree that the plaintiff has asserted a valid claim of sexual har­
assment under Title VII. In an attempt to define sexual harassment, 
courts demonstrate a willingness to follow this standard. These cases 
require that the sexually harassing conduct must be frequent enough 
to create a pervasive condition of work and be reasonably offensive in 
order to be actionable. Furthermore, courts consider whether the vic­
tim contributed to the alleged harassing conduct by w~lcoming the 
behavior. Absent these restrictions, all behavior that interferes with a 
woman's work performance arguably could be construed as actionable 
sexual harassment. However, the employee must still satisfy the other 
119. Id. at 007. 
120. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 716 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
121. Id. at 726-27. For a similar factual case, see Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative 
Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149, 1177 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (a forced kiss and sexual advances were 
not found to be unwelcome offensive behavior). 
122. Sand, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 727. 
123. 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982). 
124. Id. at 640-41. 
125. Id. at 640. 
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Henson requirements to establish a cause of action. 126 
IV. 	 CONTROVERSIAL CLAIMS OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
When faced with a case involving only a claim of verbal harass­
ment, courts must determine if this behavior is pervasive for it to be 
actionable under Title VII. 127 However, pictures from an adult maga­
zine, crude graffiti, or sexually-oriented drawings also can be asserted 
as' a basis for a sexual harassment claim. Since pictures and written 
words are not verbal conduct but convey many of the same messages 
as spoken words, this comment refers to offensive drawings and words 
as instances of symbolic harassment. 128 In the case of verbal and sym­
bolic harassment, courts have disagreed ovet: how much and what type 
of harassment produces an actionable hostile work environment claim. 
A. Verbal Harassment 
As in sexual harassment cases involving some form of physical 
contact, in verbal harassment cases the employee still must prove that 
the verbal language is pervasive (i.e., so frequent as to become a condi­
tion of employment), offensive, and unwelcome. However, verbal sex­
ual harassment may be more difficult to prove than physical sexual 
harassment because of the prevalence of abusive language in the work­
place. Furthermore, verbal abuse is generally viewed as less offensive 
than physical touching. 129 
Verbal sexually harassing language must be so frequent as to con­
stitute a condition of employment pervasive enough to affect the work 
performance of the employee. In Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 130 the 
plaintiff's plant superintendent made leers, obscene gestures, and 
126. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Henson 
requirements. 
127. First amendment concerns may be implicated in verbal harassment cases; how­
ever, this issue is not discussed in this comment. See, e.g., Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 
414 (7th Cir. 1987) (first amendment was not implicated by employee's claims of hostile 
work environment sexual harassment). 
128. See supra note 19. 
129. Indeed, under tort law, offensive physical contact is more actionable than offen­
sive verbal conduct. For instance, relief is available for many types of physical sexual inva­
sions under assault and battery. See, e.g., Hatchett v. Blacketer, 162 Ky. 266, 172 S.W. 533 
(1915) (recovery of damages for assault and battery because defendant squeezed plaintiff's 
breast). For definitions of assault and battery, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 18, 21 (1965). Unlike battery, which consists of offensive contact, "[v]erbal abuse gener­
ally is not actionable unless other conduct or circumstances can be shown to have caused 
'reasonable apprehension' of imminent contact." Comment, supra note 4, at 1477. 
130. 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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other remarks about plaintiff's sexual needs, even inviting her to have 
oral sex with him. \3l The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
affirming the holdings of the district court, stated that "sexual harass­
ment characterized 'the totality of his relationship with women in the 
plant.'''132 The plaintiff proved "that consent to [the plant superin­
tendent's] sexual advances was a condition of employment and that 
such a condition violated [the plaintiff's] Title VII rights."133 
However, in Sapp v. City of Warner Robins,134 frequent unwel­
come sexual remarks and propositions from supervisors or co-workers 
were not held to be sexual harassment because the remarks were not 
sufficiently pervasive to affect a condition of employment. 13S The 
court concluded that a "single effort to get the plaintiff to go out with 
him was not of a repeated or continuous nature ... to affect plaintiff's 
psychological well-being."136 
The offensiveness of verbal harassment depends upon the words 
used by the harasser and the manner in which they are used. In Katz 
v. Do/e,137 the plaintiff was the object of verbal sexual abuse in the 
form of sexual slurs, insults, and innuendoes made by her fellow em­
ployees over a four-year period. 138 The court held that such behavior 
constituted sexual harassment because the "words used were ones 
widely recognized as not only improper but as intensely degrading, 
deriving their power to wound not only from their meaning but also 
from 'the disgust and violence they express phonetically.' "139 Katz 
proved that she was subjected to sustained verbal sexual abuse, in­
tensely offensive both to her personally and to the reasonable person. 
Offensive verbal harassment may include language concerning 
sexual activity or the human body. In Morgan v. Hertz Corp.,I4() the 
court stated that sexually indecent comments, such as, "Did you get 
any over the weekend?" are a form of sexual harassment and discrimi­
nation on the basis of sex.141 The court came to the "conclusion that 
131. Id. at 601-02. 
132. Id. at 602. 
133. Id. at 603. 
134. 655 F. Supp. 1043 (M.D. Ga. 1987). 
135. Id. at 1049. 
136. Id. 
137. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). For an earlier discussion of the analytical frame­
work which this court used, see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
138. Katz, 709 F.2d at 254. 
139. Id. The Court of Appeals' opinion did not state what the particular words at 
issue were. 
140. 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.O. Tenn. 1981), aff'd, Sones-Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 725 
F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1984). 
141. Id. at 128. 
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sex discrimination exist[ ed] at Hertz because of the history of vulgar 
and indecent language tolerated by management and directed toward 
women employees."142 In addition, in Coley v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp. ,143 sexually harassing remarks included references to a woman's 
menstrual periods and various moods, the size of her breasts, and "in­
quiries as to when she was going to 'do something nice for him.' "144 
After determining offensiveness and frequency, a court may still 
find that no sexual harassment existed if the plaintiff welcomed the 
behavior by not objecting to it. In Benton v. Kroger Co., 14S the court 
concluded that no hostile work environment was created by the sexual 
harassment. 146 The plaintiff alleged that her manager made several 
innuendoes about sexual favors, including an invitation "to 'jump' 
over and to stop on his groin."147 In holding for the defendant, the 
court focused on the plaintiff's temper, dissatisfaction with her work 
assignments, her medical treatment, and the fact that she remained 
silent during this period of alleged sexual harassment. 148 The court, 
focusing on the supervisor's remarks, said that "[a]n inference that a 
boss may be crude and not so understanding, thereby making work life 
unpleasant for certain employees, IS not proof of sexual 
harassment. " 149 
Since verbal sexual harassment may· be viewed as less offensive 
than physical sexual harassment, the success of a plaintiff's case de­
pends upon the specific words used to harass her, and the context in 
which they were used. For instance, in Sapp and Benton, the courts 
did not view the remarks as sufficiently pervasive and offensive, com­
pared to the words used in Katz or Horn.l so A single sexual innuendo 
may be offensive to a woman and an example of sexual harassment, 
but one remark does not demonstrate a condition of employment or a 
case of actionable hostile work environment under Title YII.ISI A 
pervasive pattern of offensive behavior is clearly established by. the 
142. [d. 
143. 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
144. [d. at 647. 
145. 640 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D. Tex. 1986). 
146. [d. at 1322. 
147. [d. at 1319-20. 
148. [d. at 1321. 
149. [d. See supra note 89 for a discussion of this case in relation to a reasonable 
harasser standard. 
150. Since the offensive words in Katz were not stated in the opinion, the reader can 
only speculate as to what they were, based on the court's reference to the disgust and 
violence engendered by such words. For a better understanding of words used with sexual 
connotations, see C. MILLER & K. SWIFT, WORDS AND WOMEN 95-111 (1977). 
151. See supra note 82. 
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courts as the standard which must be applied. Only a pervasive pat­
tern of behavior can alter a woman's condition of employment when 
she is affected by verbal abuse alone. Furthermore, degrees of offen­
siveness may be difficult to label because there are different fact pat­
terns and different attitudes concerning permissible behavior among 
people and the courts. Thus, the courts must look to the "offensive" 
words and the context in which they were used to determine if the 
words constitute sexual harassment. 
B. Symbolic Harassment 
Symbolic harassment claims which involve pictures, drawings, 
graffiti, and written notes may accompany sexual harassment claims of 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. The offensiveness of 
graffiti, written notes, and "sexual" drawings depends upon the con­
tents of the particular picture or note and where they are displayed. 
For instance, in Arnold v. City of Seminole, IS2 the plaintiff's sexual 
harassment claim asserted that the defendant made vulgar sexual com­
ments, such as referring to plaintiff as "bitch," and innuendoes, mainly 
communicated by sexually graphic drawings and demeaning cartoons 
placed in public work areas. IS3 In addition to these drawings and 
cartoons, phrases, such as "The wicked witch is gone," and "RAT" 
were written on pieces of paper bearing the plaintiff's name and posted 
in the workplace. ls4 Since the plaintiff continually advised supervisors 
of the harassment and discriminatory treatment and they refused to 
take action to prevent the mistreatment, the court held that the plain­
tiff satisfied the requirements of proving sexual harassment. ISS The 
court did not distinguish the many drawings or accompanying phrases 
from other forms of sexual harassment, but said "that most, if not all, 
of the harassment ... [was] fundamentally offensive."ls6 
Two other cases elicited similar responses from the courts. In 
Porta v. Rollins Environmental Services, Inc., IS7 the plaintiff "received 
seven or eight threatening and sexually offensive, anonymous hand­
written notes in her mailbox at the plant."IS8 In the following years, 
152. 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985). 
153. [d. at 858. A co-worker posted drawings depicting poses that were offensive to 
the plaintiff, including one picture which showed a man and a woman, naked, engaging in a 
sexual act, and another which showed a man having intercourse with a goat inscribed with 
the plaintiff's name. [d. 
154. [d. at 860. 
155. [d. at 869. 
156. [d. at 870. 
157. 654 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.I. 1987), off'd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988). 
158. [d. at 1279. 
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several offensive incidents occurred, consisting of abusive verbal ex­
changes and crude graffiti on a refrigerator in a staff lounge, suggesting 
that the plaintiff had engaged in oral sex with a co-worker.lS9 The 
court stated that a jury could find a case of unwelcome harassment 
because the plaintiff was subjected to a pattern of crude comments and 
humiliating treatment and was told "that her opinion was not 
respected because she was a woman."I60 
Similarly, in Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co. ,161 co-workers continu­
ally harassed the plaintiff with offensive language, describing her as a 
"sexy bitch," "slut," and" 'h & h', which meant 'hot and horny.' "162 
She also was subjected to approximately seventy-five sexually-oriented 
drawings, posted conspicuously in the workplace, sometimes bearing 
the plaintiff's initials or depicting her engaging in various sexual 
acts.163 The court stated that her "colleagues resorted to coarse con­
duct of a sexual nature in regard to [plaintiffj; the sexually offensive 
conduct and language used would have been almost irrelevant and 
would have failed entirely in its crude purpose had the plaintiff been a 
man."I64 The court further stated that "Title VII prohibits precisely 
such psychologically damaging conditions of employment as were 
forced upon [the plaintiffj."16s This would assure that "Title VII does 
not serve as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the 
hypersensitive."166 Like the court in Arnold, this court did not distin­
guish between the verbal and symbolic' harassment, but decided that 
all of the harassment that the plaintiff suffered was unreasonable and 
malevolent. 167 
Symbolic harassment also can include commercially manufac­
tured explicit pictures found in adult magazines. In Brown v. City of 
Guthrie,168 the plaintiff claimed harassment because of repeated sexual 
innuendoes, derogatory comments, and exposure to magazines con­
taining photographs of nude women. 169 The court in Brown did not 
distinguish the various types of harassment; however, the court did say 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1282. 
161. 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.O. Wis. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 789 F.2d 540 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
162. 589 F. Supp. at 782. 
163. Id. at 782-83. 




168. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1627 (W.O. Okla. 1980). 
169. [d. at 1629. 
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that while the degree of harassment necessary to trigger Title VII pro­
tection is unclear, the various types of harassment in this case were 
sufficient to violate Title VIIYo In Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 171 an­
other case involving commercial pictures, the plaintiff was subjected to 
a work environment that included a large poster-size picture of a na­
ked woman whose legs were spread apart. l72 Her male co-workers 
and supervisors also subjected her to unwelcome touching and offen­
sive comments, such as referring to her as "Fluffy LeBush," a porno­
graphic movie actress. 173 The Michigan Court of Appeals found such 
behavior to be sexual harassment, stating that "sexual harassment can 
take many forms and is often very subtle." 174 
However, not all courts have been willing to find the display of 
nude pictures of women actionable as sexual harassment. In Rabidue 
v. Osceola Refining Co., 175 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
rejected a claim of verbal sexual harassment which also included a 
claim. of symbolic harassment. Rabidue contended that a colleague 
made extremely vulgar and obscene comments about women, and, on 
occasion, directed these comments at her.176 In addition, the col­
league and other male workers displayed magazine pictures of par­
tially nude women in offices and work areas. 177 
The district court in Rabidue stated that "the standard for deter­
mi.ling sex harassment would be different depending upon the work 
environment."178 The court, referring to sexually-oriented conversa­
tions in the workplace, stated: 
Title VII was not meant to--or can--change this. It must never be 
forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle 
for equal employment opportunity for the female workers of 
. America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was 
designed to bring about a magical transformation ·in the social mo­
res of American workers. 179 
In addition, the court considered the effect of sexually-oriented pic­
tures on the hostile work environment claim. Applying a reasonable 
170. Id. at 1632-33. 
171. 154 Mich. App. 142, 397 N.W.2d 532 (1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in pan, 431 
Mich. 26, 427 N.W.2d 488 (1988). 
172. Id. at 147-48,397 N.W.2d at 535. 
173. Id. at 148, 397 N.W.2d at 535. 
174. Id. at 154, 397 N.W.2d at 538. 
175. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), em. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987). 
176. Id. at 615. 
177. Id. 
178. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
179. Id. 
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person standard, the district court stated that "the average American 
should not be legally offended by sexually explicit posters" as "modem 
America features open displays of written and pictorial erotica."18o 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this position 
by considering the sexually-oriented posters "in the context of a soci­
ety that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits 
open displays .of written and· pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on 
prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public places."181 
The court, which decided that the vulgar language and posters had a 
"de minimis effect" on Rabidue, nonetheless concluded that such vul­
garity and posters could be "unwelcomed verbal conduct and poster 
displays of a sexual nature."182 How~ver, the court held tlJ.at the be­
havior did not result in a work environment that could be considered 
hostile or offensive and thus actionable as sexual harassment. 183 
In contrast to the majority, the dissenting opinion in Rabidue 
took a broader view of Title VII: 
Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and [offen­
sive language] from poisoning the work environment of classes pro­
tected under the Act. . . . As I believe no woman should be 
subjected to an environment where her sexual dignity and reason­
able sensibilities are visually, verbally or physically assaulted as a 
matter of prevailing male prerogative .... 184 
The dissent suggested that a reasonable woman standard should be 
applied in sexual harassment cases. 185 Furthermore, the standard 
should focus on the behavior in the context of the workplace. 186 The 
dissent disagreed with the majority's position that posters and lan­
guage should be considered in the context of societal standards, stating 
that "[t]he presence of pin-ups and misogynous language in the work­
place can only evoke and confirm the debilitating norms by which wo­
men are primarily and contemptuously valued as objects of male 
sexual fantasy."187 
The majority and the dissent in Rabidue disagreed over what con­
stitutes offensive behavior in the workplace. The majority in Rabidue 
180. [d. at 433. See supra note 89 and accompanying text for a debate on the reason­
able person and reasonable victim standard. 
181. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622. 
182. Id. 
183. Id.. 
184. Id. at 626-27 (Keitli, J., dissenting). 
185. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
186. Id. (Keith, J.; dissenting). 
187. Id. at 627 (Keith,J., dissenting). 
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argued that vulgar language and obscene pictures must interfere un­
reasonably with the plaintiff's work performance to be actionable 
under Title VII. ISS The harassment in Rabidue, whether by pictures 
or words, was not considered sexual harassment by the majority be­
cause it was "not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches 
of the plaintiff or' other female employees."IS9 However, the dissent 
offered a broader interpretation of Title VII, expanding it to include 
more forms of harassment. The dissent stated that the precise purpose 
of Title VII is to "prevent such behavior and attitudes from poisoning 
the work environment."190 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Rabidue graphically il­
lustrate a disagreement among courts over the definition of sexual har­
assment and the proper scope of Title VII. Since, VUlgarity and 
commercial pictures are prevalent in our society, a court must decide 
whether to analyze the work environment as an isolated arena, apply­
ing a reasonable victim standard, or as a part of the larger societal 
context, applying a reasonable person standard, before using Title VII 
to proscribe such behavior and remedy the injury. In Katz v. Dole,191 
a verbal sexual harassment case involving sexual innuendoes and in­
sults, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the 
u~e of Title VII should be limited, and not be employed as a "clean 
language act."192 Arguments such as those presented· by the court in 
Katz and by the majority in Rabidue, that such behavior should be 
evaluated in the context of society, are persuasive in that Title VII's 
primary purpose is to secure equal opportunity in employment and 
prohibit discrimination, not to "clean up" language in the workplace. 
The pervasive standard of severely offensive and persistent con­
duct limits those pursuing a claim of hostile work environment sexual 
harassment if the court follows this standard in all types of harass­
ment. Courts, however, must become aware that the definition of sex­
ual harassment is expanding as employees include less obvious forms 
of sexual harassment in their definition of hostile work environment. 
Perhaps the Working Women's Institute's definition of sexual harass­
ment is a more precise definition, encompassing several forms of sex­
ual harassment: 
Sexual harassment in employment is any attention of asexual na­
188. Id. at 622. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 626-27 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
191. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). 
192. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. 
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ture in the context of a work situation which has the effect of mak­
ing a woman uncomfortable on the job, impeding her ability to do 
her work, or interfering with her employment opportunities. It can 
be looks, touches, jokes, innuendoes, gestures, epithets, or direct 
propositions .... It is less obvious when a woman is forced to work 
in an environment in which she is subjected to stress or made to feel 
humiliated because of her sex through such activities as sexual slurs, 
the public display of derogatory images of women, or a requirement 
that she dress in revealing clothing. 193 
As the court in Eide said, "sexual harassment can take many forms 
and is often very subtle."194 
V. EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT TO 

INCLUDE GENDER HARASSMENT 

Sexual harassment is not easily definable as a concept, because 
men and women have different perceptions of appropriate sexual be­
havior. The definition of sexual harassment has evolved as courts have 
begun to acknowledge the existence of those differences and the differ­
ence between "sex" and "gender." The initial expansion of the con­
cept involved a categorization of sexual harassment into various types 
of behavior, such as physical, verbal, or symbolic harassment. Then, 
courts expanded the definition by focusing on the sexual nature of that 
conduct. 195 Looking for a standard on the nature of conduct, courts 
went to the EEOC guidelines' definition of sexual harassment as "un­
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature."196 Some courts then inter­
preted sexual nature to mean "sexual . . . in the sense of offensive 
behavior."197 They prohibited such behavior as "pattirig" someone on 
193. Vermuelen, Comments on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 
Proposed Amendment Adding Section 1604.11, Sexual Harassment, to Its Guidelines on Sex­
ual Discrimination, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 285, 286 (1980). 
194. Eide, 154 Mich. App. at 154, 397 N.W.2d at 538. 
195. See Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: What Makes a Work Environment 
"Hostile"?, supra note 52, at 872-74; Note, Perceptions ofHarm: The Consent Defense in 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1111 n.6 (1986). 
196. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the EEOC's 
Final Guidelines. 
197. Downes, 775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also DeCintio v. Westchester 
County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 455 (1987). 
The court in DeCintio focused on the meaning of the phrase "discrimination on the basis of 
sex," holding that the word "sex" refers to membership in a class, that the distinction must 
be based on a person's sex, not on his or her sexual affiliation. Id. at 306-07. In this case, 
the court held that a preference over another woman candidate because of a sexual relation­
ship was not discrimination based on sex. Id. at 308. 
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the buttocks, repeated sexual slurs, or posting a nude caricature of a 
woman on the wall of the workplace-all conduct which focuses on a 
woman in a sexual sense. 
However, some courts hold that "conduct of a sexual nature" en­
compasses conduct pertaining to gender as well as sex, thus expanding 
the definition of sexual harassment to include gender harassment. 198 
In McKinney v. Dole,199 the plaintiff failed to substantiate her claim of 
sexual harassment against her supervisor in district court.200 How­
ever, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re­
versed the decision, framing the issue as whether a physically 
aggressive, but not explicitly sexual, act by a male supervisor against a 
female employee constituted sexual harassment. 201 
The court decided that any pervasive harassment which occurs 
because of the sex of the harassed employee may be actionable under 
Title VII.202 The court held that the assumption that the only actiona­
ble claim of sexual harassment comprises behavior that is otherwise 
. blatantly sexual, "is legally flawed."203 While acknowledging that the 
EEOC guidelines emphasized only explicit sexual behavior, such as 
sexual advances, the court did not agree with the district court that 
this meant that all other activities not addressed by the guidelines were 
precluded from discussion.204 Furthermore, the court stated that 
"[w]e have never held that sexual harassment or other unequal treat­
ment of an employee . . . must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the 
form of sexual advances or of other incidents with clearly sexual over­
tones. "205 Therefore, sexual harassment does not necessarily have to 
be of a sexual nature in the biological sense; it may be actionable if it is 
directed at a person because of her gender. 206 
Similarly, in Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc.,207 the plaintiff 
claimed that her supervisor constantly harassed her with insults such 
as calling her the " 'pimp for the office,' " and talking to her " 'like 
198. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction 
between sex and gender. 
199. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
200. Id. at 1137. 
201. Id. at 1131. 
202. Id. at 1138. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 1138-39 n.20. See supra note 63 fOT a discussion of courts' acceptance or 
rejection of the EEOC Final Guidelines. 
205. Id. at 1138. 
206. Id. 
207. 777 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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[she] was about two years old and two inches high.' "208 The plaintiff 
was further harassed by her supervisor who suggested that "he would 
have no women in the plant at all because men were better able to 
perform all of the functions required in its operation. "209 The trial 
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment for it "con­
sidered the case as if the petitioner had been seeking relief from 'sexual 
harassment' " in the context of Henson.210 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
as to the corporate defendants and held that the "[plaintiff] was under 
no obligation to adduce proof of 'sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors [or] other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature' " in a 
Title VII claim.211 The Bell court reasoned that the hostile conduct by 
the supervisor was prohibited by Title VII because the conduct af­
fected the conditions of her employment, and the mistreatment was 
directed at her because she was a woman.212 
Other more recent cases have followed the McKinney approach, 
finding that gender harassment is actionable under Title VII. In Del­
gado v. Lehman,213 employees subjected plaintiff to such derogatory 
verbal abuses as "Okay babe," and "Listen here woman," and calling 
her stupid.214 The court referred to such behavior as sexual harass­
ment, stating that such "harassment need not take the form of overt 
sexual advances or suggestions, but may consist of such things as ver­
bal abuse of women if it is sufficiently patterned to comprise a condi­
tion and is apparently caused by the sex ofthe harassed employee."2}S 
Likewise, in Hall v. Gus Construction Co. ,216 the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit held that the district court correctly considered in­
stances of harassment, such as calling plaintiff "Herpes" or urinating 
in plaintiff's car's gas tank, as violating Title VII, even though it was 
not conduct of a sexual nature.217 The court reasoned that 
"[i]ntimidation and hostility toward women because they are women 
can obviously result from conduct other than explicit sexual ad­
vances."218 Since Congress did not specify all conduct that would be 
208. Id. at 1499 (quoting Deposition of Delores D. Bell at 60 and 48). 
209. Id. at 1501. 
210. Id. at 1501-02. 
211. Id.at1503. 
212. Id. at 1501-03. 
213. 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
214. Id. at 463. 
215. Id. at 468. 
216. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). 
217. Id. at 1013-14. 
218. Id. at 1014. 
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prohibited under Title VII, the court viewed the "Congressional inten­
tion to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms" as 
prevailing.219 
In one opinion, although only in the dissent, the expansive defini­
tion of sexual harassment in McKinney was called into question. In 
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. ,220 the plaintiff alleged a hostile work envi­
ronment composed of racial and sexual hostility, where a supervisor 
referred to blacks as "niggers" and "coons," and a security guard re­
ferred to plaintiff as "Buffalo Butt."221 In addition, she alleged that 
she was subjected to disparate treatment by both supervisors and co­
workers, citing examples such as forcing her to make a four or five 
foot jump off a loading dock, not permitting her to sit while con­
ducting inspections, refusing her a lunch break, and making her walk 
around the plant with wet pants after sitting on a wet seat. 222 The 
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for considera­
tion of all the evidence relating to sexual harassment within the Mc­
Kinney standard.223 Agreeing with the McKinney interpretation, the 
majority rejected the narrow EEOC definition of sexual harassment as 
only comprising sexual advances or other instances of behavior with 
sexual overtones. 224 
The dissent, however, believed that McKinney went "far beyond 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 22S• •• as to the breadth of Title VII, 
and in defining how pervasive the 'unequal treatment' must be."226 
"The Supreme Court does not center on 'unequal treatment' but on 
sexual harassment of the plaintiffwith the consequences on her condi­
tions of employment."227 A "sufficiently patterned or pervasive" stan­
dard for unequal treatment would, as Judge Seth suggested, "do 
violence to disparate treatment doctrines. "228 
In addition to this dissent, other courts have expressed judicial 
reluctance with regard to an expansion of the definition of sexual har­
219. [d. (citing Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 
506,514 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cen. 
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972»). 
220. 833 F.2d 1406 (lOth Cir. 1987). 
221. [d. at 1409. 
222. [d. In addition, Hicks also alleged specific instances of sexual behavior, i.e., 
rubbing her thighs, squeezing her buttocks, and grabbing her breasts. [d. at 1409-11. 
223. [d. at 1415. 
224. [d. 
225. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
226. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1420 (Seth, J., dissenting). 
227. [d. (Seth, J., dissenting). 
228. [d. (Seth, J., dissenting). 
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assment. In Turley v. Union Carbide Corp.,229 the district court re­
sisted an attempt to expand the definition of sexual harassment to 
encompass discriminatory behavior of a non-sexual nature.230 The 
plaintiff alleged that her foreman "picked" on her all of the time, but 
that he did not make any sexual advances, sexual jokes, or attempts to 
touch her.231 The court stated that: 
The [sexual harassment] theory rests upon conduct which can be 
characterized as sexual. "Sex" in this instance does not mean gen­
der. Rather, it is used pursuant to its more popular meaning. Thus, 
while the harassment may be directed at a member of the female 
sex, it is a harassment which plays upon the stereotypical role of the 
female as a sexual object.232 
This court distinguished discrimination on the basis of sex and gender 
harassment from sexual harassment by focusing on the nature of the 
harassment. Since the foreman had harassed her in a non-sexual man­
ner, the court ruled that this behavior did not fall under the label of 
sexual harassment, but was actionable under a disparate treatment 
analysis233 as discrimination on the basis of sex.234 The Turley court 
recognized a cause of action based only upon unwelcome sexual con­
duct that was explicit behavior and discrimination on the basis of sex, 
noting that" 'sex' in this instance does not mean gender."23s 
Therefore, the dispositive issue for these courts is to define the 
reach of Title VII. Title VII seems to prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of sex, because the statutory term used is "sex."236 What is not 
clear is whether Congress intended to make discrimination on the ba­
sis of gender unlawful.237 The court in Williams addressed the issue of 
congt;essional intent, stating that the "plain meaning of the term 'sex 
discrimination' as used in [Title VII] encompasses discrimination be­
229. 618F. Supp. 1438 (S.D.W.Va. 1985). 
230. Id. at 1441-42. 
231. Id. at 1442. 
232. Id. at 1441-42. 
233. Sexual harassment claims were once viewed as a form of "disparate treatment." 
In disparate treatment cases, "[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... Undoubtedly dispa­
rate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII." 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15. (1977). For a 
discussion of why sexual harassment claims were once viewed as disparate impact claims, 
see Vhay, supra note 71, at 338-51. 
234. Turley, 618 F. Supp. at 1442. 
235. Id. at 1441. 
236. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the language of Title VII. 
237. See. e.g.. Downes, 775 F.2d at 290. 
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tween genders."238 Because Title VII prohibits discrimination with re­
spect to conditions of employment, courts expanded this definition of 
discrimination to include other behavior, i.e., unwelcome sexual ad­
vances, in the ambit of unlawful discrimination. The statute was inter­
preted as prohibiting offensive behavior directed at an employee in the 
sexual sense, although it continued to include gender harassment as 
well.239 Nevertheless, most courts construed behavior relating only to 
physical sex as actionable sexual harassment. 
However, the position taken by McKinney and the majority in 
Hicks broadens the courts' definition of sexual harassment to include 
behavior that is non-sexual, behavior that is directed at a person be­
cause of her gender. The Hicks dissent disagreed with McKinney that 
any harassment or unequal treatment of an employee because of her 
gender can comprise an illegal practice of sexual harassment under 
Title VII.240 McKinney represents an appropriate reading of Title VII 
in terms of the "Congressional intention to define discrimination in the 
broadest possible terms."241 Indeed, it is the purpose of Title VII to 
prohibit both discrimination on the basis of sexual advances and une­
qual treatment on the basis of gender, as the courts found in McKin­
ney, Hill, Delgado, and Hicks. 
The foundation of any sexual harassment claim will always be 
discrimination on the basis of sex. Additionally, however, much of the 
behavior surrounding sexual advances and other offensive conduct in­
cludes subtle or direct forms of mistreatment of women based on stere­
otypical characterizations according to gender roles.242 For instance, 
in Porta v. Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. ,243 the plaintiff, who 
was subjected to a pattern of offensive treatment, was told "that her 
opinion was not respected because she was a woman. "244 In Delgado 
v. Lehman,24S the illegal behavior consisted of verbal abuses of wo­
238. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
239. Downes, 775 F.2d at 290. 
240. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1420 (Seth, J., dissenting). 

'241. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 

242. For instance, in Lipsett v. University of P.R., No. 87-1931 (1st Cir. Oct. 26, 
1988)(LEXIS, Genfed library, US App file), the harassment included walls "with Playboy 
centerfolds," a list posted on a bulletin board of "sexually charged nicknames for all of the 
female residents," and repeated sexual advances. Id. at 14-15. In addition to the sexual 
behavior, plaintiff alleged a "barrage of anti-female commentary while she was a medical 
student." Id. at 69. The court accepted evidence of a non-sexual "anti-female" attack "to 
have contributed significantly to the hostile work environment." Id. at 74. 
243. 654 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988). 
244. Id. at 1282. 
245. 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
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men.246 In Arnold v. City ofSeminole,247 the court included non-sex­
ual instances, such as the phrases, "The wicked witch is gone," and 
"RAT" in its analysis of sexual harassment.248 
Thus; acts that are not overtly sexual, but are still offensive, may 
be defined as sexual harassment if they constitute a prohibited pattern 
of discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII. Gender harass­
ment will be included in this definition as long as the conduct would 
not have occurred but for her gender, and occurred over a period of 
time long enough to satisfy a pervasive standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to pursue a hostile work environment claim is derived 
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finding that Title VII 
"reaches all discrimination affecting employment which is based on 
gender,"249 courts have accepted claims of unwelcome sexual advances 
and other sexual offensive conduct within the meaning of Title VII as 
sexual harassment. 
However, neither Congress nor the courts adequately defined 
what sexual harassment is. The EEOC attempted to define sexual har­
assment broadly and to define the hostile work environment as consist­
ing of "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" which interferes 
with an individual's work performance.2SO The guidelines clearly re­
ferred to harassment based on sex in the biological sense. A variety of 
distinctions were then developed in case law to define behavior as sex­
ual harassment. Harassment could take many foqns: physical, verbal, 
or symbolic. Courts considered the frequency of the conduct and the 
offensiveness of the behavior in order to find a sexually harassing con­
dition of employment. Courts also focused on the behavior between 
the harasser and the victim to determine if the conduct was unwel­
come in the sense that the employee did not solict the undesirable con­
duct. These distinctions were then evaluated within a pervasive 
standard of severity and persistence. 
Yet, if a court is confronted with a case of harassment that exhib­
its no behavior directed at a woman in a sexual sense, but behavior 
directed at her because of her gender, the existing EEOC definition is 
246. Id. at 468. 
247. 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985). 
248. Id. at 860. 
249. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658. 
250. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1988). 
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not helpful. The definition of sexual harassment should be modified to 
include not only sexual conduct, but also gender-based behavior. In 
effect, courts have been dealing with gender harassment since the first 
case involving a claim of a hostile work environment. Many instances 
of sexual harassment are instances of gender harassment. When a co­
worker selects and displays a calendar with pictures of nude women, 
he is making a symbolic statement that could be actionable as sexual 
harassment as well as gender harassment, since such a display in the 
workplace could be construed as a subtle form of mistreatment of wo­
men. Likewise, sexual harassment toward a woman can obviously re­
sult from conduct other than explicit behavior, if it interferes with her 
work performance. Courts should follow Congress' intent "to define 
discrimination in the broadest possible terms."2S1 
Barbara L. Zalucki 
251. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 
